Gender differences in preferences in the literature by Drucker, Luca Flóra et al.
Luca FLóra Drucker, DánieL Horn & Hubert János kiss
132
6.2 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN PREFERENCES  
IN THE LITERATURE
Luca Flóra Drucker, Dániel Horn & Hubert János Kiss
The innate and learned characteristics of women and men may profoundly de-
termine their educational and labour market choices. This chapter focuses on 
gender differences in a group of non-cognitive skills:1 risk preferences, com-
petitive preferences, and social preferences.2 These preferences may have an 
impact on labour market performance. For example, risk-averse individuals 
are more likely to choose professions with secure pay, while more competitive 
individuals tend to perform better in professions where they are under daily 
pressure. The chapter strongly relies on relevant summary papers of Bertrand 
(2011), Croson–Gneezy (2009), and Niederle (2015).
Risk preferences
Risk aversion is measured by experiments involving various tasks in econom-
ics. One of the most famous lab experiments was conducted by Holt–Laury 
(2002). In this experiment, participants had to choose between two options 
(A and B). In option A, participants had a chance to win 2 dollars with prob-
ability p, and 1.6 dollars with probability 1 – p. In option B, the probabilities 
were the same but the amounts were 3.85 dollars and 0.1 dollars. Participants 
made ten consecutive choices between A and B, across which the probabil-
ity (p) changed from 0.1 to 1, in 0.1 increments. Obviously, when p = 1, op-
tion B is more attractive, as one will surely get 3.85 dollars instead of 2 dollars. 
However, when p = 0.1, the expected value of A is 1.17 dollars higher than that 
of B, therefore participants will be more likely to choose A. The question is, 
when does a person switch between A and B. The switching point is regarded 
as the measure of risk-taking. Risk-lovers tend to prefer higher rewards (3.58 
dollars) already at low values of p, while risk-averse people switch only when 
there is a fairly high probability of winning the larger reward. There are oth-
er types of tasks, as well. For example, Eckel–Grossman (2002) alter rewards 
instead of probabilities in the consecutive choices, while several other stud-
ies rely on the investment game introduced by Gneezy–Potters (1997), or the 
bomb risk elicitation task invented by Crosetto–Filippin (2013).
Most papers either find that women are more risk-averse or do not find gen-
der differences in risk preferences. Holt– Laury (2002) report that women are 
slightly more risk-averse over small stakes (with no significant difference with 
larger stakes), while Eckel–Grossman (2002) find that women are considerably 
more risk-averse. Charness–Gneezy (2012) review studies using the investment 
game of Gneezy–Potters (1997) and report that in most studies (14 out of 15) 
1 The stability of non-cognitive 
skills over time is discussed in 
Subchapter 6.1 and Box K6.1.
2 One of the most researched 
preferences is time preference; 
however, gender differences in 
this preference do not receive 
much attention in the literature, 
therefore we did not include 
it in this paper (for example 
Dittrich–Leipold [2014] found 
men less patient but Wang et al. 
[2016] did not find gender dif-
ferences).
6.2 Gender differences in preferences in the literature
133
women are more risk-averse than men. However, Crosetto–Filippin (2016) do 
not find gender differences when using the bomb risk elicitation task.
The results obviously raise the question whether it is possible to assess at-
titudes to risk in a simple experiment or risk preferences are more complex. 
This is the idea behind domain-specific risk-taking. Weber et al. (2002) evalu-
ate risk-taking in five domains (ethics, finances, health/ safety, social relations, 
recreation) by voluntarily completed questionnaires. The findings indicate 
that the magnitude of risk-taking does depend on the domain. The findings 
are consistent with Dohmen et al. (2011), who find that women are more risk-
averse than men in all domains.
Overall, the majority of surveys and studies suggest that women are more 
risk-averse. However, we agree with Niederle’s (2015) warning that the size of 
gender differences (if one finds any) in risk preferences depends on the way 
of measuring them, and that these differences are mostly small, even if statis-
tically significant. The results of the experiments and surveys show that risk 
taking is a complex matter and is impossible to evaluate it with a single indi-
cator, therefore we must give due consideration to whether the indicator used 
in a given study is generalizable.
As for the labour market consequences, Bonin et al. (2007), using German 
data, find that more risk-averse individuals tend to choose a profession with 
a more stable pay. Additionally, Dohmen–Falk (2011) reveal that more risk-
tolerant people are more likely to choose a job with a performance-based pay, 
and women are less willing to work for a flexible pay. The results of Le et al. 
(2011), relying on Australian data, are also consistent with the above: women 
are more risk-averse than men. The authors also report that higher risk toler-
ance is associated with higher pay and therefore the gender difference in risk 
preferences contribute to the gender pay gap. This effect is not significant, and 
it explains a maximum of 3 per cent of the pay gap.
Competitiveness
Psychology literature generally accepts the observation that boys spend more 
time playing games involving competition, while girls tend to prefer games 
without winners and losers. They also find that boys are more likely to con-
sider themselves competitive than girls (Campbell, 2013). As several important 
and highly paid professions have a competitive environment, it is not surpris-
ing that women are underrepresented in them. Experimental economics has 
provided numerous useful insights over the past 15 years into what is behind 
gender differences in attitudes towards competition.
The first experiment about competition was conducted by Gneezy et al. 
(2003). At one of the most prestigious technical universities of Israel (where 
there is strong competition for admission), students faced a computer-based 
task: they had to solve as many mazes as possible in fifteen minutes. When in 
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the first round students got a reward for each solved maze (piece-rate pay), there 
was no significant difference between the performance of boys and girls. In the 
next round there was a competition-based pay scheme. There were three boys 
and three girls in a group. Only the best-performing group member was reward-
ed, but the reward was six times as much as the piece-rate in the first round.3 
This time the performance of boys significantly improved compared to the 
round with piece-rate pay, while the performance of girls did not change. Thus 
boys performed considerably better than girls in a competitive environment.
However, there are two important differences between piece-rate pay and 
competitive pay. On the one hand, when competing, reward is partly depend-
ent on the performance of others, on the other hand, reward is less secure com-
pared to piece-rate pay – and, as mentioned before, women may be more risk 
averse. In the third round (random pay), based on the number of solved mazes, 
a randomly selected participant received a reward of similar size as in the com-
petitive round, in order to eliminate the effect of risk aversion. In this way the 
insecurity of payment remained but there was no competition. Now, boys and 
girls performed similarly as in the piece-rate round. Therefore, the gender differ-
ence in average performance is probably due to attitudes towards competition.
The authors also explored whether gender composition of the groups has 
an impact on performance. They repeated the competitive round with same-
gender groups. Boys performed equally well as in the earlier competition with 
mixed-gender groups. By contrast, the performance of girls significantly im-
proved when they had to compete against girls. Several other studies reported 
similar findings (Günther et al. 2010, Shurchkov, 2012).
It should be noted though that boys usually only performed better in ‘boy-
ish’ tasks when competing but in more ‘girlish’ tasks (such as reading com-
prehension) the studies did not find such differences. Moreover, Cárdenas et 
al. (2012) found that when the task was rope jumping, girls performed bet-
ter when they had to compete. In conclusion, the performance of girls either 
does not improve or improves less than that of boys in a competitive situation.
Niederle–Vesterlund (2007) and later research revealed that women are 
more likely to avoid competition than men. For example, even though there 
is no difference between genders in the likelihood of successfully completing 
a task, girls tend to choose piece-rate pay instead of a potentially higher but 
competition-based pay.4 This results in relative losses for girls, as they do not 
participate in competition, which could allow them to make greater profit.
Gender differences in preferences for competition already emerge in kin-
dergarten (Sutter, Glätzle–Rützler, 2014). They persist throughout the entire 
career (Mayr et al. 2012), although they change with age and follow a reverse 
U-shaped curve. Social background also influences preferences for competi-
tion: the higher his or her socio-economic background, the more competitive 
one is. Nevertheless, while there is no difference in competitiveness between 
3 Different students partici-
pated in the different rounds, 
thus it is not the impact of 
competitive or non-competi-
tive settings on an individual 
that results reveal, but how 
the performance of boys and 
girls changes in such cases on 
average.
4 This statement remains true 
when risk preferences are also 
taken into account.
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boys and girls of low socio-economic background, with high socioeconomic 
background, boys are more willing to compete than girls (Bartling et al. 2012).
In addition to identifying individual characteristics influencing competitive-
ness, it is also important to identify institutional changes that could reduce 
the gender gap in competitiveness. Large gender gap in competitiveness may 
result in a significant loss in social welfare if good-performing women do not 
dare to enter competition and therefore do not enrol in schools or enter occu-
pations where their performance could realise. Since we saw that women are 
more willing to compete against women but less willing to compete against 
men, competition could be distorted in a way to promote women’s interest 
in it. For example, if not only the best performance but also the best female 
performance was rewarded, women might be more inclined to compete. Bala­
foutas–Sutter (2012) and Niederle et al. (2012) reported that these ideas ac-
tually work in experiments and more good-performer women are willing to 
engage in competition. Obviously, more research is needed into the topic.
Preferences for competition may significantly affect how one performs in 
education and at work. For example, they may have an impact on school ad-
mission results (Ors et al. 2013), on achievement in vocational competitions 
(Iriberri–Rey–Biel, 2018), or on study choices (Buser et al. 2014). Attitudes 
to competition also play a role in choosing a workplace. Relying on British 
and American data, Manning–Saidi (2010) and Flory et al. (2015) report that 
women are less likely to choose a competitive job. Also, according to Reuben et 
al. (2017), gender differences in competitiveness and self-confidence explain 
nearly four-fifth of gender differences in wage expectations.
In summary, the gender difference in preferences for competition is one of 
the most robust observations of experimental economics, and this difference 
partly explains later gender gaps in education and at work.
Social preferences
The simplest definition of social preferences is that the utility of an individ-
ual does not only depend on her own payoff but also on the payoff of others. 
Thus, altruism, envy, attitudes towards inequality, and reciprocity may all 
be manifestations of social preferences. Women are usually considered to be 
more social (less selfish, more cooperative etc.), because there are significantly 
more women in occupations requiring cooperation with others (e.g. nursing 
and teaching). But is this really the case?
Researchers usually study social preferences with incentivized tasks. Redis-
tributive preferences can be analysed most easily with dictator games. Here, 
one of the parties divides a sum of money between herself and the other par-
ty. Since the experiment is usually anonymous and participants do not know 
each other, absent social preferences (such as generosity) we expect the ‘dic-
tator’ not to give anything to the other party. We can interpret the amount 
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allocated to the other party as the manifestation of altruism.5 When only 
considering the amount of money given to the other party, there are no con-
clusive results on whether women are more generous (Croson–Gneezy, 2009, 
Engel, 2011, Niederle, 2015).
There is another classic game, called the ultimatum game, which is different 
from the dictator game in that here the other party is not passive. If the other 
party accepts the amount offered, the proposed allocation is realized, if she 
rejects, both parties leave empty-handed. The interpretation of the ultimatum 
game is not as straightforward as that of the dictator game. In the ultimatum 
game, the decision of the proposer is also defined by risk aversion in addition 
to altruism, since she wishes to avoid the other party rejecting her offer. Ac-
cordingly, there are mixed results concerning gender differences: sometimes 
women, sometimes men offer higher amounts.
Results vary similarly concerning the trust game, the third classic game, 
where the first party can send any fraction of a given amount to the second 
party. The sent amount increases (most often triples), and then the second 
party decides how much of this increased amount she sends back to the first 
party. Croson–Gneezy (2009) reported that women’s decisions varied more 
in these experiments: apparently, they are more responsive to the details of 
the experiment than men.
Social preferences also include cooperation skills, which are typically assessed 
by the prisoners’ dilemma game, or its generalisation, the public goods game, as 
well as by other social dilemma games. One of the most important characteris-
tics of these games is that from the individual point of view, the dominant strat-
egy is to be selfish, however, total payoff is maximised by unselfish behaviour. 
Studies usually conclude that there is no profound difference between genders 
in the amounts offered if the gender of the other party is unknown. In mixed 
pairs, women are more cooperative than men but when comparing single-sex 
male or female pairs, men cooperate more (Balliet et al. 2011).
Gender differences in bargaining and negotiation are also related to social 
preferences. Women tend to be less competitive during bargaining: they ask 
for less money and are less likely to engage in bargaining at all (Säve–Söder­
bergh, 2007, Small et al. 2007). Bowles et al. (2005) observe that women are 
better at bargaining when they do it for others than when they do it for them-
selves, while as for men there is no such difference. It may be because women 
are more caring with others than with themselves, or because they are afraid 
of the negative reactions they get if they stand up too strongly for themselves. 
Bowles et al. (2007) claim the latter is a real fear: the participants of the ex-
periment tended to be more critical towards women fighting for higher wages.
In summary, although there are no significant gender differences in social 
preferences in lab experiments, there may be substantial differences in char-
acteristics such as bargaining skills.
5 List (2007) and Bardsley 
(2008) showed that minor 
changes to the experiment 
easily make participants less 
altruistic, therefore the gener-
osity seen in the dictator game 
may be also due to the design 
of the experiment in addition 
to altruism.
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Conclusion
How important are gender differences in preferences? Niederle (2015) notes 
that she sees two camps of researchers studying gender differences. One of 
these camps emphasise the differences between the genders, while the other 
the similarities. Based on the findings we reported, the situation concerning 
preferences is not so simple: the given context defines whether one finds dif-
ferences or similarities between the genders. Considering competition, stud-
ies largely agree that men are more competitive. As for risk preferences and 
social preferences, the situation is not that clear-cut. Women may be more 
risk-averse than men but it also depends on the domain, the situation, and 
the assessment method, while in the case of social preferences the picture is 
even less clear. It is important to note that although the advantage of lab ex-
periments is that effects may be better separated, and in this way the presence 
of gender differences may be confirmed with more certainty, the statistically 
significant differences found in lab experiments are not necessarily significant 
in real life – their impact in everyday life may be negligible. Furthermore, it is 
well-researched that non-cognitive factors have a great impact in school, in the 
labour market and in other segments of life (for example Borghans et al. 2008, 
Manning–Swaffield, 2008); however, we have less information on how impor-
tant are gender differences in preferences in differences in real-life outcomes.
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